there is Newcomb's problem. In the first edition of The Logic of Decision Jeffrey advised agents to choose actions with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. "Causal" decision theorists have argued that this fails to adequately discriminate the causal properties of acts from their merely evidential features, and that Jeffrey's theory should be rejected because it sometimes advises agents to choose acts that indicate desirable results without causing them.
Though serious, these problems should not blind us to the fact that Jeffrey's system has two real advantages over rival decision theories. First, it can be underwritten by Ethan Bolker's representation theorem (1966), the "gold standard" in this area as far as I am concerned. Second, its basic equation for computing expected utilities has a property called partition invariance that any reasonable account of rational choice should possess. I believe that these two features make Jeffrey's theory indispensable to any account of practical rationality. I am going to argue for three conclusions:
? The non-uniqueness problem is not as serious as it seems because (a) theories that purport to solve it do so only at the cost of making implausible assumptions about the structure of rational preference rankings, and (b) if we really want unique representations we can obtain them within Jeffrey's theory by imposing independent constraints on beliefs to go with the constraints we impose on preferences. * Insofar as we seek theories of rational decisionwmaking that apply to the sorts of choices that people might actually face, we must formulate our equations for expected utility in a partition independent way. * While Jeffrey's account is not viable as a logic of decision, its underlying account of rational belief and desire must be incorporated into any reasonable decision theory, including causal decision theory.
2. Jeffrey's Theory of "Pure" Rationality. In defending these claims I am going to employ a highly simplified model of the decision-maker (that is a little richer than the one found in The Logic of Decision). I shall assume an agent whose desires are encoded in a preference ranking, a binary relation X ? Y that holds between propositions X and Y (in some Boolean algebra Q) just in case, all things considered, she would rather learn of X's truth than learn of Y's truth. The agent's beliefs are encoded in her confidence ranking, a binary relation X . -. Y that holds between propositions (in Q) just in case she is at least as confident in X's truth as she is in Y's truth. I am also going to assume that any question about an agent's rationality can be answered by looking at her preference and confidence Although Jeffrey does not do things this way, it is useful to think of this theory as being divided into three distinct components: aformal axiology, or theory of rational preference, that tells us which preference rankings are rational, but does so without placing any constraints on confidence rankings; an epistemology, or theory of rational belief; that tells us which confidence rankings are rational without placing any constraints on the agent's preferences; and a theory of coherence, that tells us which preference rankings and confidence rankings can be rationally held together. When rewritten in these terms the theory can be expressed as follows:
AXIOLOGY: A preference ranking ? is rational only if there exists at least one probability/utility pair (prob, des) that satisfies the J/Bequation and whose utility weakly represents >.
EPISTEMOLOGY: A confidence ranking .>. is rational only if there is at least one probability function, prob, that weakly represents it.
COHERENCE: If the probability in every (prob, des) pair whose utility weakly represents ? assigns a higher value to X than to Y, then every probability that represents .>. should assign X a higher value than Y.
AXIOLOGY differs from Jeffrey's full theory of rationality in that it imposes constraints only on preferences. Even though the existence of a probability function is required for an agent's preferences to be counted rational, AXIOLOGY, taken by itself, says nothing about the relationship between this probability and the agent's confidence ranking. It requires only that there be a non-empty set D of (prob, des) pairs satisfying the J/B equation whose utility represents the agent's preferences. For future reference, let's call this the representing set for >. EPISTEMOLOGY is an expression of the broadly Bayesian, or "probabilist," doctrine that rational belief is subject to the laws of probability. It says that there must be a non-empty set C of probability functions, the representing set for .>., all of whose members weakly represent .>.. COHERENCE is the weakest condition that yields Jeffrey's theory of pure rationality when combined with AXIOLOGY and EPISTEMOLOGY. COHER-ENCE makes it clear how, within Jeffrey's system, having certain desires can commit a person to holding certain beliefs. We can think of an agent's preferences as implicitly defining her manifest confidence ranking according to the rule that X .>.M Y iff prob(X) -prob( Y) for all pairs (prob, des) E D. When X ranked above Y in this ranking, an outside observer who knows everything there is know about the agent's preferences would be able to determine that she is more confident in X than in Y. Coherence says that an agent's confidence ranking must be an extension of her manifest confidence ranking.
Thanks to Ethan Bolker we know a great deal about what it takes to satisfy the strictures of Jeffrey's axiology. In his 1966, Bolker proved a representation theorem that entails that any preference ranking satisfying certain axiomatically specified constraints, the JeffreylBolker Axioms, can be represented by the utility of at least one (prob, des) pair that satisfies the J/B-equation. I will not reproduce these axioms here (cf. Jeffrey 1978), but I do want to emphasize that they constrain preferences alone. As such, they do not impose any direct constraints on the agent's confidence ranking unless one conjoins them with COHERENCE.
There is a representation theorem, due to the French mathematician Villegas (1964) Villegas proved that under these conditions there will be a unique probability function that represents .>..1 One does not find axioms like these anywhere in The Logic of Decision. This is because (at the time of the first edition) Jeffrey was in the grips of a false, but widely endorsed, picture of the relationship between rational belief and desire. In the broadly pragmatist tradition of Ramsey, de Finetti, and Savage, one seeks to justify the basic tenets of probabilist epistemology by deriving them from constraints on rational desire. The goal is to show that any agent whose preferences are rational, and whose beliefs are related to her preferences in the proper way, will automatically have a confidence ranking that is probabilistically representable. In the context of Jeffrey's theory, a pragmatic vindication of probabilism of this type would consist in showing that EPISTEMOLOGY can be deduced from AXIOLOGY and theory of COHERENCE.
The broad structure of The Logic of Decision might suggest that this sort of pragmatism is what Jeffrey had in mind. After all, the only axioms to be found in the book constrain rational preference. Nevertheless, the kind of pragmatism described here does not sit comfortably within Jeffrey's system. This is where non-uniqueness becomes a worry. Most expected utility theories are founded on representation theorems that purport to deliver representations for preferences in which the probability in unique and the utility is unique up to the choice of a zero and unit. Within the Jeffrey/Bolker framework, in contrast, there is a degree of freedom in the choice of a representation that is not exhausted even when a unit and zero for utility is fixed. The key result is found in Bolker's 1966. There are a number of ways to "spin" this result. I think it shows that an adequate theory of pure rationality must treat probabilism as an independent requirement of rationality that cannot be reduced to constraints on preferences. Pragmatist proponents of probabilism can try to avoid this conclusion by either (i) denying that rational agents hold beliefs that are not directly manifested in their preferences, or (ii) claiming that the inability of Jeffrey's theory to deliver unique representations constitutes sufficient grounds for rejecting it. Neither alternative is acceptable. The idea in (i) would be to supplement COHERENCE with its converse. (Joyce 1999, ?3.3) , but the basic point is that unique representations are secured only by making highly implausible assumptions about the complexity of the set of prospects over which the agent's preferences are defined. For any two events X and Y that figure in the agent's 2. According to Jeffrey, the first person to make this point was Isaac Levi. confidence ranking, there must be prospects A and B such that A's outcome when Xobtains (fails to obtain) is exactly as desirable as B's outcome when Y obtains (fails to obtain).3 This sometimes occurs, but it must happen in every single case if we are to extract a unique probability representation from a set of preferences. When X and Y sit at opposite ends of a preference ranking, however, there will often be no remotely plausible way to find suitable prospects to serve as A and B. The moral is that the nonuniqueness of probability representations in Jeffrey's theory provides us with no reason to reject it in favor of some other theory since no other theory really does any better.
Even if this were not so, there would still be a second, stronger reason not to give up on Jeffrey's theory. Jeffrey's rule for assigning utilities is partition invariant in the sense that a prospect's desirability can always be written as des(X) = Ei prob(X/Ei)des(X & Ei) where {E1, E2, E3, . . .} can be any countable set of mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive propositions. Not all expected utility theories are expressed in a partition invariant form.
Savage's theory, for example, is not partition invariant. His equation U(A) = Es prob(S)u(A(S))
for computing expected utilities is sure to yield correct expected utilities only when it is applied to "grand world" decisions whose outcomes are individuated so finely that everything the agent cares about is resolved by the state of the world once she chooses an action. Partition invariance, in my view, is not an optional virtue for an expected utility theory to have, since only a partition invariant theory can be applied to the kinds of "small world" decisions that people face in real life (cf. Joyce 1999, ?4.1). This leaves us with only one reasonable "spin" left to put on Result 1. Given that we want a theory of "pure" rationality that both incorporates a partition invariant expected utility and a probabilist epistemology we must be willing to augment the Jeffrey/Bolker axioms for rational preferences with constraints, like de Finetti's axioms and the Villegas principle, that apply directly to rational beliefs. Result 2 shows that the non-uniqueness inherent in Jeffrey's theory of preference can be removed by imposing constraints directly on confidence rankings. Non-uniqueness is thus not an intrinsic feature of preferences in Jeffrey's theory; rather, it is a consequence of trying to make a theory of rational preference do something that can only be accomplished when such a theory is combined with an epistemology. If you are with me on this, then you are probably wondering why it was worth making all the fuss over Jeffrey's theory. Why should a causal decision theorist worry about the formulation of a rival decision theory? The reason is that we causal decision theorists need Jeffrey's theory to properly formulate our own. The thing that makes Jeffrey's theory so indispensable to us is its partition invariance. As usually formulated causal decision theory is not partition invariant, which suggests that it can only be applied to decision problems that are posed in just the right way. While some may be willing to live with this (cf., e.g., Lewis 1981, 1 1; Sobel 1994, 16 1), we can do better once we recognize that Jeffrey discovered the correct theory of "pure" rationality but applied it incorrectly to the problem of choosing actions.
The Theory of Rational
To find a partition invariant expression for causal decision theory one needs a way of assigning utilities to the act/state conjunctions that appear in the sorts of decision problems people actually encounter; one needs a rule that associates a causal utility U Once we have a supposition rule in place we can define a notion of conditional utility, or utility under a supposition.
CONDITIONAL UTILITY: Given a supposition function prob(.11.) and an assignment of utilities to atoms of Q, the utility of X on the supposition that C is defined by the Generalized JIB-Equation
des(XIIC) = 1. [prob(o & X1IC)Iprob(XIIC)] des(o).
The Generalized J/B-Equation is just the ordinary J/B-equation with the agent's unconditional probability replaced by her probability under the supposition that C obtains. I maintain that any reasonable theory of conditional utility must assume this form because any such theory must be partition invariant, and any partition invariant utility theory must have this form. Thus, a theory of conditional utility must be based on Jeffrey's theory of pure rationality in the sense that, for each condition C, a rational agent's preferences given C and beliefs given C must satisfy AXIOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, and COHERENCE. The fact that evidential and causal decision theory can both be written as instances of the Generalized J/B-equation shows us that the two theories agree about the nature of pure rationality. Jeffrey taught us that unconditional beliefs and desires must satisfy the principles of AXIOLOGY, PROB-ABILISM, and COHERENCE. Once we recognize that this also goes for beliefs and desires under a supposition, we come to appreciate that all value is news value viewedfrom some epistemic perspective. Though causal and evidential decision theorists may disagree about the correct epistemic perspective to adopt when evaluating actions, that is the sole source of their disagreement. Everything else we need to know about the nature of rationality was covered in The Logic of Decision.
